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We introduce a natural Turing-complete extension of first-order logic FO. The extension adds two
novel features to FO. The first one of these is the capacity to add new points to models and new tuples
to relations. The second one is the possibility of recursive looping when a formula is evaluated using
a semantic game. We first define a game-theoretic semantics for the logic and then prove that the
expressive power of the logic corresponds in a canonical way to the recognition capacity of Turing
machines. Finally, we show how to incorporate generalized quantifiers into the logic and argue for a
highly natural connection between oracles and generalized quantifiers.
1 Introduction
We introduce a natural Turing-complete extension of first-order logic FO. This extension essentially
adds two features to basic FO. The first one of these is the capacity to add new points to models and
new tuples to relations. The second one is the possibility of looping when a formula is evaluated using a
semantic game.
Logics with different kinds of recursive looping capacities have been widely studied in the context of
finite model theory [16]. Typically such logics are fragments of second-order predicate logic. A crucial
weakness in the expressivity of k-th order predicate logic is that only a finite amount of information
can be encoded by a finite number of quantified relations over a finite domain. Intuitively, there is no
infinitely expandable memory available. Thus k-th order logic is not Turing-complete. To overcome this
limitation, we add to first-order logic operators that enable the addition of new elements to the domains
of models and new tuples to relations. Coupling this feature with the possibility of recursive looping
leads to a very natural Turing-complete extension of first-order logic.
In addition to operators that enable the extension of domains and relations, we also consider an oper-
ator that enables the deletion of tuples of relations. It would be natural to also include to our framework
an operator that enables the deletion of domain points. This indeed could (and perhaps should) be done,
but for purely technical reasons, we ignore this possibility.
We provide a game-theoretic semantics for the novel logic. A nice feature of the logic—let us simply
call it L , or logic L —is that it simulates halting as well as diverging computations of Turing machines
in a very natural way. This behavioural correspondence between Turing machines and the logic L stems
from the appropriate use of game-theoretic concepts. Let us have a closer look at this matter.
Let A be a model and ϕ a formula of first-order logic. Let f be an assignment function that interprets
the free variables of ϕ in the domain A of A. The semantic game G(A, f ,ϕ) is played between the two
players ∃ and ∀ in the usual way (see, e.g., [11, 18]). If the verifying player ∃ has a winning strategy
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in the game G(A, f ,ϕ), we write A, f |=+ ϕ and say that ϕ is true in (A, f ). If, on the other hand, the
falsifying player ∀ has a winning strategy, we write A, f |=− ϕ and say that ϕ is false in (A, f ). Since ϕ
is a first-order formula, we have A, f |=+ ϕ iff it is not the case that A, f |=− ϕ .
If ϕ is a formula of IF logic [12] or dependence logic [21], for example, the situation changes. It
is then possible that neither player has a winning strategy in the semantic game. This results in a third
truth value (indeterminate). Turing machines of course exhibit analogous behaviour: on an input word
w, a Turing machine can halt in an accepting state, halt in a rejecting state, or diverge.
The logic L incorporates each of these three options in its semantics in a canonical way. For each
Turing machine TM, there exists a sentence of ϕTM such that TM accepts the encoding of a finite model
A iff A, f |=+ ϕTM, and furthermore, TM rejects the encoding of A iff A, f |=− ϕTM. Therefore TM
diverges on the encoding of A iff neither the verifying nor the falsifying player has a winning strategy
in the game invoving A, f and ϕ . For the converse, for each formula χ of the logic L , there exists
a Turing machine TMχ such that a similar full symmetry exists between semantic games involving χ
and computations involving TMχ . By Turing-completeness of a logic we mean exactly this kind of a
behavioral equivalence between Turing machines and formulae.
The moves in the semantic games for L are exactly as in first-order logic in positions involving the
first-order operators ∃x, ∨, ¬. In positions of the type Ixϕ , a fresh point is inserted into the domain
of the model investigated, and the variable x is interpreted to refer to the fresh point. There are similar
operators for the insertion (deletion) of tuples into (from) relations. The recursive looping is facilitated by
operators such as the ones in the formula 1
(
P(x)∨ 1), where the player ending up in a position involving
the novel atomic formula 1 can jump back into a position involving 1(P(x)∨ 1). Semantic games are
played for at most omega rounds 1 and can be won only by moving to a position involving a first-order
atomic formula. Winning and losing in positions involving first-order atoms is determined exactly as in
first-order logic.
Operators that bear a resemblance to the ones used in the logic L have of course been considered in
logical contexts before. Lauri Hella has suggested (personal communication) extending first-order logic
with recursive looping constructors that resemble those investigated in this article. His idea involves
studying fixed point logics using a game-theoretic semantics with somewhat different kinds of winning
conditions than the ones we shall formulate below. The framework does not involve modifying the
domains of structures. The insertion (deletion) of tuples to (from) relations is an important ingredient
in dynamic complexity (see, e.g., [8, 19]), although motivated and used there in a way that is quite
different from the approach in this article. Logics that involve jumping into different model domains
include for example the sort logic of Va¨a¨na¨nen ([20],[22]), a logic which can in a sense be regarded as
the strongest possible model theoretic logic. Other systems with similar constructors or motivations to
those considered in this article include for example BGS logic [2], WHILE languages [1] and abstract
state machines [10, 3]. See also the articles [5] and [14].
The reason we believe that the logic L is particularly interesting lies in its simplicity and exact be-
havioural correspondence with Turing machines on one hand, and in the fact that it provides a canonical
unified perspective on logic and computation on the other hand. The logic L canonically extends ordi-
nary first-order logic to a Turing-complete framework, and thereby serves not only as a novel logic, but
also as a novel model of computation. It is also worth noting that the fresh operators of L nicely capture
two classes of constructors that are omnipresent in the practise of mathematics: scenarios where fresh
points are added to investigated constructions (or fresh lines are drawn, etc.) play a central role in ge-
ometry, and recursive looping operators are found everywhere in mathematical practise, often indicated
1Omega of course refers to the smallest infinite ordinal.
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with the help of the famous three dots (...).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define some preliminary notions and give a
formal account of the syntax L . In Section 3 we develop the semantics of L . In Section 4 we establish
the Turing-completeness of L in restriction to the class of word models. In Section 5 we use the results
of Section 4 in order to establish Turing-completeness of L in the class of all finite models. In Section
6 we show how to extend L with generalized quantifiers. We also briefly discuss the conceptiual link
between oracles and generalized quantifiers.
2 Preliminaries
Let Z+ denote the set of positive integers. Let VAR := {vi | i∈ Z+ } be the set of variable symbols used
in first-order logic. We mainly use metavariables x,y,z,xi,yi,zi, etc., in order to refer to the variables
in VAR. Let k ∈ Z+. We let VARSO(k) be a countably infinite set of k-ary relation variables. We let
VARSO =
⋃
k∈Z+ VARSO(k).
Let τ denote a complete relational vocabulary, i.e., τ is the union
⋃
k∈Z+ τk, where τk is a countably
infinite set of k-ary relation symbols. Let σ ⊆ τ . Define the language L ∗(σ) to be the smallest set S
such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. If x1, ...,xk are variable symbols and R ∈ σ a k-ary relation symbol, then R(x1, ...,xk) ∈ S.
2. If x1, ...,xk are variable symbols and X ∈VARSO(k) a k-ary relation variable, then X(x1, ...,xk)∈ S.
3. If x,y are variable symbols, then x = y ∈ S.
4. If k ∈ N is (a symbol representing) a natural number, then k ∈ S.
5. If ϕ ∈ S, then ¬ϕ ∈ S.
6. If ϕ ,ψ ∈ S, then (ϕ ∧ψ) ∈ S.
7. If x is a variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then ∃xϕ ∈ S.
8. If x is a variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then Ixϕ ∈ S.
9. If x1, ...,xk are variable symbols, R ∈ σ a k-ary relation symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then IRx1,...,xk ϕ ∈ S.
10. If x1, ...,xk are variable symbols, X ∈ VARSO a k-ary relation variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then
IXx1,...,xk ϕ ∈ S.
11. If x1, ...,xk are variable symbols, R ∈ σ a k-ary relation symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then DRx1,...,xk ϕ ∈ S.
12. If x1, ...,xk are variable symbols, X ∈ VARSO a k-ary relation variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then
DXx1,...,xk ϕ ∈ S.
13. If ϕ ∈ S and k ∈ N, then kϕ ∈ S.
While we could develop a sensible semantics for the language L ∗(σ), we shall only consider a
sublanguage L (σ) ⊆ L ∗(σ) that avoids certain undesirable situations in semantic games. Let ϕ ∈
L ∗(σ) be a formula. Assume that ϕ contains an atomic subformula k ∈ N and another subformula k ψ .
Assume that k is not a subformula of k ψ . Then we say that ϕ has a non-standard jump. Note that we
define that every instance of the syntactically same subformula of ϕ is a distinct subformula: for example,
the formula (P(x)∧P(x)) is considered to have three subformulae, these being the left and right instances
of P(x) and the formula (P(x)∧P(x)) itself. Thus for example the formula
(
k(P(x)∧k) ∧ k (P(x) ∧ k)
)
has a non-standard jump. We define L (σ) to be the largest subset of L ∗(σ) that does not contain
formulae with non-standard jumps.
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The reason we wish to avoid non-standard jumps is simple and will become entirely clear when we
define the semantics of L (σ) in Section 3. Let us consider an example that demonstrates the undesirable
situation. Consider the formula
(
k ∧ ∃xk P(x)
)
of L ∗(σ). As will become clear in Section 3, it is
possible to end up in the related semantic game in a position involving the atomic formula P(x) without
first visiting a position involving the formula ∃xk P(x). This is undesirable, since a related variable
assignment function will then not necessarily give any value to the variable x. For this reason we limit
attention to the fragment L (σ) containing only formulae without non-standard jumps.
Before defining the semantics of the language L (σ), we make a number of auxiliary definitions.
Let A, B, etc., be models. We let A, B, etc., denote the domains of the models in the usual way. A
function f that interprets a finite subset of VAR∪VARSO in the domain of a model A is called an
assignment. Naturally, if X ∈ VARSO ∩Dom( f ) is a k-ary relation variable, then f (X) ⊆ Ak, and if
x ∈ VAR∩Dom( f ), then f (x) ∈ A. We let f [x 7→ a] denote the valuation with the domain Dom( f )∪{x}
defined such that f [x 7→ a](x) = a and f [x 7→ a](y) = f (y) if y 6= x. We analogously define f [X 7→ S],
where X ∈ VARSO is a k-ary relation variable and S ⊆ Ak. We will also construct valuations of, say, the
type f [x 7→ a,y 7→ b,X 7→ S]. The interpretation of these constructions is clear.
We define the set of free variables free(ϕ) of a formula ϕ ∈L (σ) as follows.
1. If R ∈ σ , then free(R(x1, ...,xk)) = {x1, ...,xk}.
2. If X ∈ VARSO(k), then free(X(x1, ...,xk)) = {X}∪{x1, ...,xk}.
3. free(x = y) = {x,y}.
4. free(k) = /0.
5. free(¬ϕ) = free(ϕ).
6. free((ϕ ∧ψ)) = free(ϕ)∪ free(ψ).
7. free(∃xϕ) = free(ϕ)\{x}.
8. free(Ixϕ) = free(ϕ)\{x}.
9. free(IRx1,...,xk ϕ) = free(ϕ)\{x1, ...,xk}.
10. free(IXx1,...,xk ϕ) = free(ϕ)\{X ,x1, ...,xk}.
11. free(DRx1,...,xk ϕ) = free(ϕ)\{x1, ...,xk}.
12. free(DXx1,...,xk ϕ) = free(ϕ)\{X ,x1, ...,xk}.
13. free(kϕ) = free(ϕ).
A formula ϕ of L (σ) is a sentence if free(ϕ) = /0.
3 A Semantics for L (σ)
In this section we define a game-theoretic semantics for the language L (σ). The semantics extends
the well-known game-theoretic semantics of first-order logic (see, e.g., [18]). The semantic games are
played by two players ∃ and ∀.
Let ϕ be a formula of L (σ). Let A be a σ -model, and let f be an assignment that interprets the free
variables of ϕ in A. Let # ∈ {+,−} be simply a symbol. The quadruple (A, f ,#,ϕ) defines a semantic
game G(A, f ,#,ϕ). The set of positions in the game G(A, f ,#,ϕ) is the smallest set S such that the
following conditions hold.
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1. (A, f ,#,ϕ) ∈ S.
2. If (B,g,#′,¬ψ) ∈ S, then (B,g,#′′,ψ) ∈ S, where #′′ ∈ {+,−}\{#′}.
3. If (B,g,#′,(ψ ∧ψ ′)) ∈ S, then (B,g,#′,ψ) ∈ S and (B,g,#′,ψ ′) ∈ S.
4. If (B,g,#′,∃xψ) ∈ S and a ∈ B, then (B,g[x 7→ a],#′,ψ) ∈ S.
5. If (B,g,#′, Ixψ) ∈ S and b 6∈ B is a fresh element2 , then (B∪{b},g[x 7→ b],#′,ψ) ∈ S; we define
B∪{b} to be the σ -model C where b is simply a fresh isolated point, i.e., the domain of C is
B∪{b}, and RC = RB for each R ∈ σ .
6. If (B,g,#′, IRx1,...,xk ψ)∈ S and b1, ...,bk ∈ B, then (B∗,g∗,#′,ψ)∈ S, where B∗ is obtained from B
by defining RB∗ := RB∪{(b1, ...,bk)}, and g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk]. For each relation symbol
P ∈ σ \{R}, we have PB∗ := PB. The models B and B∗ have the same domain.
7. Assume (B,g,#′, IXx1,...,xk ψ) ∈ S and b1, ...,bk ∈ B. If X ∈ Dom(g), call C := g(X). Otherwise let
C := /0. Then (B,g∗,#′,ψ) ∈ S, where g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk,X 7→ (C∪{(b1, ...,bk)})].
8. If (B,g,#′,DRx1,...,xk ψ) ∈ S and b1, ...,bk ∈ B, then (B∗,g∗,#′,ψ) ∈ S, where B∗ is obtained from
B by defining RB∗ := RB \ {(b1, ...,bk)}, and g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk]. For each relation
symbol P ∈ σ \{R}, we have PB∗ := PB. The models B and B∗ have the same domain.
9. Assume (B,g,#′,DXx1,...,xk ψ) ∈ S and b1, ...,bk ∈ B. If X ∈ Dom(g), call C := g(X). If X 6∈
Dom(g), define C := /0. Then (B,g∗,#′,ψ) ∈ S, where g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk,X 7→ (C \
{(b1, ...,bk)})].
10. If (B,g,#′,kψ) ∈ S, then (B,g,#′,ψ) ∈ S.
The game G(A, f ,#,ϕ) is played as follows.
1. Every play of the game begins from the position (A, f ,#,ϕ).
2. If a position (B,g,#′,¬ψ) is reached in a play of the game, the play continues from the position
(B,g,#′′,ψ), where #′′ ∈ {+,−}\{#′}.
3. If a position (B,g,#′,(ψ ∧ψ ′)) is reached, then the play continues as follows. If #′ = + (re-
spectively, #′ = −), then the player ∀ (respectively, ∃) picks a formula χ ∈ {ψ ,ψ ′}, and the play
continues from the position (B,g,#′,χ).
4. If a position (B,g,#′,∃xψ) is reached, then the play continues as follows. If #′ =+ (respectively,
#′ = −), then the player ∃ (respectively, ∀) picks an element b ∈ B, and the play continues from
the position (B,g[x 7→ b],#′,ψ).
5. If a position (B,g,#′, Ixψ) is reached, then the play continues from the position (B∪{b},g[x 7→
b],#′,ψ), where B∪{b} is the σ -model C, where b is simply a fresh isolated point3 , i.e., the
domain of C is B∪{b}, and RC = RB for each R ∈ σ .
6. Assume a position (B,g,#′, IRx1,...,xk ψ) has been reached. The play of the game continues as
follows. If #′ = + (respectively, #′ = −), then the player ∃ (respectively, ∀) chooses a tuple
(b1, ...,bk) ∈ Bk. The play of the game continues from the position (B∗,g∗,#′,ψ), where B∗ is
obtained from B by redefining RB∗ := RB∪{(b1, ...,bk)}, and g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk]. Other
relations and the domain remain unaltered.
2To avoid introducing a proper class of new positions here, we assume b = B. Since B 6∈ B, the element b = B is a fresh
element. Only a single new position is generated.
3Recall that we let b := B in order to avoid proper classes of new positions.
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7. Assume a position (B,g,#′, IXx1,...,xk ψ) has been reached. The play of the game continues as
follows. If #′ = + (respectively, #′ = −), then the player ∃ (respectively, ∀) chooses a tuple
(b1, ...,bk) ∈ Bk. The play of the game continues from the position (B,g∗,#′,ψ), where g∗ :=
g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk,X 7→ (C ∪ {(b1, ...,bk)})]; here C = g(X) if X ∈ Dom(g), and otherwise
C = /0.
8. Assume a position (B,g,#′,DRx1,...,xk ψ) has been reached. The play of the game continues as
follows. If #′ = + (respectively, #′ = −), then the player ∃ (respectively, ∀) chooses a tuple
(b1, ...,bk) ∈ Bk. The play of the game continues from the position (B∗,g∗,#′,ψ), where B∗ is
obtained from B by redefining RB∗ := RB \{(b1, ...,bk)}, and g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk]. Other
relations and the domain remain unaltered.
9. Assume a position (B,g,#′,DXx1,...,xk ψ) has been reached. The play of the game continues as
follows. If #′ = + (respectively, #′ = −), then the player ∃ (respectively, ∀) chooses a tuple
(b1, ...,bk) ∈ Bk. If X ∈ Dom(g), call C := g(X). Otherwise define C := /0. The play of the
game continues from the position (B,g∗,#′,ψ), where g∗ := g[x1 7→ b1, ...,xk 7→ bk,X 7→ (C \
{(b1, ...,bk)})].
10. If a position (B,g,#′,kψ) is reached, then the play of the game continues from the position
(B,g,#′,ψ).
11. If a position (B,g,#′,k) is reached, then the play of the game continues as follows. If #′ = +
(respectively, #′ = −) and there exists a subformula kψ of the original formula ϕ , then the player
∃ (respectively, ∀) chooses some subformula kχ of ϕ , and the play continues from the position
(B,g,#′,kχ). If no subformula kψ exists, the play of the game ends.
12. If ψ is an atomic formula R(x1, ...,xk), X(x1, ...,xk) or x = y, and a position (B,g,#′,ψ) is reached,
then the play of the game ends.
A play of the game G(A, f ,#,ϕ) is played up to omega rounds. If a play of the game continues for
omega rounds, then neither of the two players wins the play. If a play of the game ends after a finite
number of rounds, then one of the players wins the play. The winner is determined as follows.
1. If the play ends in a position (B,g,#′,k), which may happen in the pathological case where there
are no subformulae of ϕ of the type kψ , then ∃ wins if #′ =− and ∀ wins if #′ =+.
2. If the play ends in a position (B,g,#′,ψ), where ψ is an atomic formula R(x1, ...,xk), X(x1, ...xk)
or x = y, then the winner of the play is determined as follows.
(a) Assume #′ =+. Then ∃ wins if B,g |= ψ . If B,g 6|= ψ , then ∀ wins. Here |= is the semantic
turnstile of ordinary first-order logic.
(b) Assume #′ =−. Then ∀ wins if B,g |= ψ . If B,g 6|= ψ , then ∃ wins.
A strategy of ∃ in the game G(A, f ,#,ϕ) is simply a function that determines a unique choice for the
player ∃ in every position of the game G(A, f ,#,ϕ) that requires ∃ to make a choice. A strategy of ∀ is
defined analogously. A strategy of ∃ (∀) in the game G(A, f ,#,ϕ) is a winning strategy if every play of
the game where ∃ (∀) makes her moves according to the strategy, ends after a finite number of rounds in
a position where ∃ (∀) wins.
We write A, f |=+ ϕ iff the player ∃ has a winning strategy in the game G(A, f ,+,ϕ). We write
A, f |=− ϕ iff ∃ has a winning strategy in the game G(A, f ,−,ϕ). By duality of the rules of the game, it
is easy to see that ∃ has a winning strategy in G(A, f ,−,ϕ) iff ∀ has a winning strategy in G(A, f ,+,ϕ).
Similarly, ∃ has a winning strategy in G(A, f ,+,ϕ) iff ∀ has a winning strategy in G(A, f ,−,ϕ).
Let ϕ be a sentence of L (σ). We write A |=+ ϕ iff A, /0 |=+ ϕ , where /0 denotes the empty valuation.
Similarly, we write A |=− ϕ iff A, /0 |=− ϕ .
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4 Turing-Completeness
Let σ be a finite nonempty set of unary relation symbols. let Succ be a binary relation symbol. A word
model A over the vocabulary {Succ}∪σ is defined as follows.
1. The domain of A is a nonempty finite set.
2. The binary predicate Succ is a successor relation over A, i.e., a binary relation corresponding to a
linear order, but with maximum out-degree and in-degree equal to one.
3. Let b ∈ A denote the smallest element with respect to Succ. We have b 6∈ PA for each P ∈ σ .
(This is because we do not want to consider models with the empty domain; the empty word will
correspond to the word model with exactly one element.) For each element a∈A\{b}, there exists
exactly one predicate P ∈ σ such that a ∈ PA.
Word models canonically encode finite words. For example the word abbaa over the alphabet {a,b} is
encoded by the word model M over the vocabulary {Succ,Pa,Pb} defined as follows.
1. M = {0, ...,5}.
2. SuccM is the canonical successor relation on M.
3. PMa = {1,4,5} and PMb = {2,3}.
If w is a finite word, we let M (w) denote its encoding by a word model in the way defined above. If W is
a set of finite words, then M (W ) = {M (w) |w ∈W }. If Σ is a finite nonempty alphabet, we let M (Σ)
denote the vocabulary {Succ}∪{Pa |a ∈ Σ}.
We define computation of Turing machines in the standard way that involves a possible tape alphabet
in addition to an input alphabet. These two alphabets are disjoint. Let Σ be a finite nonempty alphabet.
Then Σ∗ is the set of all inputs to a Turing machine TM whose input alphabet is Σ. During computation,
TM may employ an additional finite set S of tape symbols. That set S is the tape alphabet of TM. There
is a nice loose analogy between tape alphabet symbols of Turing machines and relation variable symbols
in VARSO used in formulas of L .
Theorem 4.1. Let Σ be a finite nonempty alphabet. Let TM be a deterministic Turing machine with the
input alphabet Σ. Then there exists a sentence ϕTM ∈L (M (Σ)) such that the following conditions hold.
1. Let W ⊆ Σ∗ be the set of words w such that TM halts in an accepting state with the input w. Then
for all w ∈ Σ∗, M (w) |=+ ϕTM iff w ∈W.
2. Let U ⊆ Σ∗ be the set of words u such that TM halts in a rejecting state with the input u. Then for
all w ∈ Σ∗, M (w) |=− ϕTM iff w ∈U.
Proof. We shall define a sentence ϕTM such that the semantic games involving ϕTM simulate the action
of TM.
Let Q be the set of states of TM. For each q ∈ Q, reserve a variable symbol xq. Furthermore,
let ystate be a variable symbol. Intuitively, the equality ystate = xq will hold in the semantic game
G(M (w), /0,+,ϕTM) exactly when TM is in the state q during a run with the input w.
Simulating the action of the head of the Turing machine TM is a bit more complicated, since when
defining the new position of the head with a subformula of ϕTM, information concerning the old position
must be somehow accessible.4 Fix two variables x1head and x2head. These variables will encode the position
of the head. Define three further variables y1head, y2head , and yhead. The tape of TM will be encoded by
4Note that we assume, w.l.o.g., that TM has a single head.
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the (dynamically extendible) successor relation Succ, which is a part of the model (or models, to be
exact) constructed during the semantic game. The variables x1head and x2head will denote elements of the
successor relation. Intuitively, yhead = y1head will mean that x1head indicates the current position of the head
of TM, while yhead = y2head will mean that x2head indicates the position of the head of TM. The value of
x1head will always be easily definable based on the value of x2head, and vice versa, the value of x2head will be
definable based on the value of x1head .
If TM employs tape alphabet symbols s 6∈ Σ, these can be encoded by unary relation variables Xs.
Intuitively, if u is an element of the domain of the model under investigation, then Xs(u) will mean that
the point of the tape of TM corresponding to u contains the symbol s. Similarly, for an input alphabet
symbol t ∈ Σ , Pt(u) will mean that the point of the tape of TM corresponding to u contains the symbol t.
The sentence ϕTM will contain subformulae which are essentially (but not exactly, as we shall see)
of the type (
ψstate ∧ψtape position
)
→
(
ψnew state∧ψnew tape position ∧ loop
)
,
where loop is simply the atomic formula 1, which indicates that the semantic game ought to be continued
from some subformula 1ψ of ϕTM. The sentence ϕTM will also contain subformulae which are essentially
of the type (
ψstate ∧ψtape position
)
→
(
ψnew final state∧ψnew tape position ∧⊤
)
and (
ψstate ∧ψtape position
)
→
(
ψnew final state∧ψnew tape position ∧⊥
)
where in the first case the final state is an accepting state, and in the second case a rejecting state. Here
⊤ (⊥) is the formula ∀xx = x (¬∀xx = x).
Let s, t ∈ Σ be input alphabet symbols of TM. Consider a transition instruction of TM of the type
T (qi,s) = (q j, t,right), which states that if the state is qi and the symbol scanned is s, then write t to the
current cell, change state to q j, and move right. Let us call this instruction instr. The instruction instr
defines a formula ψinstr . Assume q j is not a final state. Let us see how ψinstr is constructed.
Define the formula ψqistate := ystate = xqi . Define the formula ψssymbol to be the conjunction of the
following formulae.
1. yhead = y1head → Ps(x1head),
2. yhead = y2head → Ps(x2head).
Define χ ′1 to be the formula
DPs x IPt y∃x
2
head∃yhead∃ystate
(
x = x1head ∧ y = x
1
head ∧ yhead = y
2
head ∧ ystate = xq j ∧ χ ′ ∧ 1
)
,
where χ ′ is a formula that forces x2head to be interpreted as the successor of x1head with respect to Succ. It is
possible that no successor of x1head exists in the current model. In that case a successor can be constructed
by appropriately using the operators Iz and ISuccuv. To cover this case, define χ ′′1 to be the formula
DPs x IPt y Iz ISuccuv ∃x
2
head∃yhead∃ystate
(
x= x1head ∧ y= x
1
head ∧ yhead = y
2
head ∧ ystate = xq j ∧ χ ′ ∧ χ ′′ ∧ 1
)
,
where χ ′′ forces the fresh point z to be the successor of x1head with respect to Succ, and χ ′ forces x2head to
be the successor of x1head . Let α be a formula that states that x1head has a successor with respect to Succ in
the current model. Define χ1 to be the conjunction (α → χ ′1)∧ (¬α → χ ′′1 ).
The formula χ1 simulates the instruction instr when the current position of the head of TM is encoded
by x1head . The formula determines a new position for x2head based on the current position of x1head . A similar
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formula χ2 can be defined analogously to deal with the situation where the current position of the head
is encoded by x2head.
Define β to be the conjunction of the formulae
1. yhead = y1head → χ1,
2. yhead = y2head → χ2.
Define ψinstr to be the formula
(
ψqistate∧ψssymbol
)
→ β . Formulae ψinstr′ , where instr′ tells TM to move
to a final state, are defined similarly, but do not have the atom 1. Instead, accepting states have the atom
⊤ and rejecting states the atom ⊥. We shall not explicitly discuss for example instructions where the
head is to move left, since all possible instructions can be easily specified by formulae analogous to the
ones above.
Recall that Q is the set of states of TM. Let q1, ...,qn enumerate the elements of Q. Define
Ix := Iy1head Iy
2
head Ixq1 ....Ixqn .
Let I be the set of instructions of TM. The sentence ϕTM is the formula
Ix ∃yhead∃x1head∃x
2
head∃ystate
(
ψinitial ∧ 1
( ∧
instr∈I
ψinstr
) )
,
where ψinitial states that the following conditions hold.
1. ystate is equal to xq, where q is the beginning state of TM.
2. yhead is equal to y1head .
3. x1head is interpreted as the point corresponding to the beginning position of the head of TM.
It is not difficult to see that ϕTM corresponds to TM in the desired way.
We then prove that every sentence of L spefifying a property of word models can be simulated by a
Turing machine. For this purpose, we use Ko¨nig’s Lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (Ko¨nig). Let T be a finitely branching tree with infinitely many nodes. Then T contains an
infinite branch.
In the following, accepting means halting in an accepting state, and rejecting means halting in a
rejecting (i.e., non-accepting) state.
Theorem 4.3. Let Σ be a finite nonempty alphabet. Let ϕ be a sentence of L (M (Σ)). Then there exists
a deterministic Turing machine TM such that the following conditions hold.
1. Let W ⊆ Σ∗ be the set of words w such that M (w) |=+ ϕ . Then for all w ∈ Σ∗, TM accepts w iff
w ∈W.
2. Let U ⊆ Σ∗ be the set of words w such that M (w) |=− ϕ . Then for all w ∈ Σ∗, TM rejects w iff
w ∈U.
Proof. Fix some positive integer k. Given an input word w, the Turing machine TM first enumerates all
plays of G(M (w), /0,+,ϕ) with k rounds or less. If ∃ wins such a play, TM checks whether there is a
winning strategy for ∃ that always leads to a win in k or fewer rounds, meaning that no play where ∃
follows the strategy lasts for k+ 1 rounds or more, and ∃ wins all plays where she follows her strategy.
Similarly, if ∀ wins a play with k or fewer rounds, TM checks whether there is a winning strategy for ∀
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that always leads to a win in at most k rounds. If there is such a strategy for ∃ (∀), then TM halts in an
accepting (rejecting) state.
If no winning strategy is found, the machine TM checks all plays with k+1 rounds. Again, if ∃ wins
such a play, TM checks whether there is a winning strategy for ∃ that always leads to a win in at most
k+ 1 rounds, and similarly for ∀. Again, if a winning strategy for ∃ (∀) is found, then TM halts in an
accepting (rejecting) state.
If no winning strategy is found, the machine scans all plays of the length k + 2, and so on. This
process of scanning increasingly long plays is carried on potentially infinitely long.
Now assume, for the sake of contradiction, that ∃ (∀) has a winning strategy with arbitrarily long
plays resulting from following the strategy. Then the game tree restricted to paths where ∃ (∀) follows
the strategy has infinitely many nodes. Let T denote the restriction of the game tree to paths where the
strategy is followed. Since each game position can have only finitely many successor positions, and since
T is infinite, we conclude by Ko¨nig’s lemma that T has an infinite branch. Thus the strategy of ∃ (∀)
cannot be a winning strategy. This is a contradiction. Hence each winning strategy has a finite bound n
such that each play where the strategy is followed, goes on for at most n rounds.
Thus TM has the desired properties. The crucial issue here is that there exist a finite number of
possible moves at every position of the game. This finiteness is due to the underlying models always
being finite and properties of the operators of the logic L .
Note that our translations of Turing machines to formulae of L and formulae of L to Turing ma-
chines are both effective.
5 Arbitrary Structures
Above we limited attention to word models. This is not necessary, as Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 can easily be
generalized to the context of arbitrary finite structures. In this section we show how this generalization
can be done.
When investigating computations on structure classes (rather than strings), Turing machines of course
operate on encodings of structures. We will use the encoding scheme of [16]. Let τ be a finite relational
vocabulary and A a finite τ-structure. In order to encode the structure A by a binary string, we first need
to define a linear ordering of the domain A of A. Let <A denote such an ordering.
Let R ∈ τ be a k-ary relation symbol. The encoding enc(RA) of RA is the |A|k-bit string defined as
follows. Consider an enumeration of all k-tuples over A in the lexicographic order defined with respect to
<A. In the lexicographic order, (a1, ...,ak) is smaller than (a′1, ...,a′k) iff there exists i∈ {1, ...,k} such that
ai < a
′
i and a j = a′j for all j < i. There are |A|k tuples in Ak. The string enc(RA) is the string t ∈ {0,1}∗
of the length |A|k such that the bit ti of t = t1 ... t|A|k is 1 if and only if the i-th tuple (a1, ...,ak) ∈ Ak in the
lexicographic order is in the relation RA.
The encoding enc(A) is defined as follows. We first order the relations in τ . Let p be the number of
relations in τ , and let R1, ...,Rp enumerate the symbols in τ according to the order. We define
enc(A) := 0|A| ·1 · enc(RA1 ) · ... · enc(RAp ).
Notice that the encoding of A depends on the order <A and the ordering of the relation symbols in τ .
Let C be the class of exactly all finite τ-models. Let C+, C− and C0 be subclasses of C such that the
following conditions hold.
1. Each of the three classes C+, C− and C0 is closed under isomorphism.
14 Some Turing-Complete Extensions of First-Order Logic
2. The classes are disjoint, i.e., the intersection of any two of the three classes is empty.
3. C+∪C−∪C0 = C .
We say that (C+,C−,C0) is a Turing classification of finite τ-models if there exists a Turing machine
TM such that the following conditions hold.
1. The input alphabet of TM is {0,1}.
2. TM rejects every input string that is not of the type enc(A) for any finite τ-strucure A.
3. There exists an ordering <τ of τ such that the following conditions hold.
(a) Let A ∈ C . Let enc(A) and enc′(A) be two encodings of A, both using the order <τ of τ but
possibly a different ordering of A. Then one of the following three conditions holds.
i. TM accepts both strings enc(A) and enc′(A).
ii. TM rejects both strings enc(A) and enc′(A).
iii. TM diverges on both input strings enc(A) and enc′(A).
(b) Let A ∈ C . Let enc(A) be an encoding of A according to the order <τ . The following
conditions hold.
i. TM accepts enc(A) iff A ∈ C+.
ii. TM rejects enc(A) iff A ∈ C−.
iii. TM diverges on the input enc(A) iff A ∈ C0.
We say that TM witnesses the Turing classification (C+,C−,C0).
The logic L combines the expressivity of first-order logic with the possibility of building fresh
relations over fresh domain elements. The recursive looping capacity enables a flexible way of using
such fresh constructions. Therefore it is not difficult to see that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.1. Let τ be a finite relational vocabulary and (C+,C−,C0) a Turing classification of finite
τ-models. Let TM be a Turing machine that witnesses the classification (C+,C−,C0). Then there exists
a sentence ϕTM of L (τ) such that the following conditions hold for finite τ-models A.
1. A |=+ ϕTM iff A ∈ C+ .
2. A |=− ϕTM iff A ∈ C− .
Proof sketch. The simulation of a machine TM operating on encodings of structures A is done by a
sentence ϕTM of L as follows.
The “input” to the formula ϕTM is a finite τ-structure A. The formula ϕTM first uses A in order to
construct a word model MA that corresponds to a string enc(A) that encodes A. The domains of MA
and A are disjoint. The relation symbols of MA are symbols in VARSO, not symbols in τ . Once MA has
been constructed, the formula ϕTM uses MA in order to simulate the computation of TM on the string
enc(A). The simulation is done in the way described in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
The construction of the word model MA from A is not difficult. First a fresh successor relation SA
over the domain of A is constructed using the operator ISxy. The symbol S is not in τ . Instead, we use
a fresh symbol in VARSO. Also, the successor symbol S will not be part of the vocabulary of the word
model MA.
Let <A denote the linear order canonically associated with the successor relation SA. The order <A,
together with an ordering of τ , define a string enc(A). The model MA is the word model corresponding
to the string enc(A).
Due to the very high expressivity of the logic L , is not difficult to build MA using SA and possibly
further auxiliary relations. Thus writing the formula ϕTM is relatively straightforward. We skip further
details.
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Theorem 5.2. Let τ be a finite relational vocabulary. Let ϕ be a τ-sentence of L . Then there exists
a Turing classification (C+,C−,C0) of finite τ-models such that for all finite τ-models A, the following
conditions hold.
1. A ∈ C+ iff A |=+ ϕ .
2. A ∈ C− iff A |=− ϕ .
Proof. The proof is practically identical to the proof of Theorem 4.3.
6 Generalized Quantifiers and Oracles
The relationship between oracles and Turing machines is analogous to the relationship between gener-
alized quantifiers and logic. Oracles allow arbitrary jumps in computations in a similary way in which
generalized quantifiers allow the assertion of arbitrary properties of relations. In this section we briefly
discuss extensions of the logic L with generalized quantifiers. For the sake of simplicity, we only
consider unary quantifiers of the width one, i.e., quantifiers of the type (1).
A unary generalized quantifier of the width one (cf. [17]) is a class C of structures (A,B) such that
the following conditions hold.
1. A 6= /0 and B ⊆ A.
2. If (A′,B′)∈C and if there is an isomorphism f : A′→A′′ from (A′,B′) to another structure (A′′,B′′),
then we have (A′′,B′′) ∈ C .
Below the word quantifier always means a unary generalized quantifier of the width one.
Let Q be a quantifier. Let A be a model with the domain A. We define QA := { B | (A,B) ∈ Q }.
Extend the formula formation rules of first-order logic such that if ϕ is a formula and x a variable, then
ˆQxϕ is a formula. The operator ˆQx binds the variable x, so the set of free variables of ˆQxϕ is obtained
by removing x from the set of free variables of ϕ . The standard semantic clause for the formula ˆQxϕ is
as follows.
Let A be a model that interprets the non-logical symbols in ϕ . Let f be an assignment function that
interprets the free variables in ˆQxϕ . Then A, f |= ˆQxϕ iff {a ∈ A | A, f [x 7→ a] |= ϕ } ∈ QA.
We then discuss how generalized quantifiers can be incorporated into the logic L . This simply
amounts to extending the game-theoretic semantics such that generalized quantifiers are taken into ac-
count. This is accomplished in the canonical way described below.5
Assume we have reached a position (A, f ,+,ϕ) in a semantic game. If QA = /0, the player ∃ loses the
play of the game. Otherwise the player ∃ chooses a set S ∈ QA. The player ∀ then chooses either a point
s ∈ S of a point s′ ∈ A\S. (Here A is of course the domain of A.) Suppose first that ∀ chooses s∈ S. Then
the game continues from the position (A, f [x 7→ s],+,ϕ). Suppose then that ∀ chooses s′ ∈ A \S. Then
the game continues from the position (A, f [x 7→ s′],−,ϕ). The intuition behind these moves is that ∃ first
chooses the set S of exactly all witnesses for ϕ , and this set S must be in QA. Then ∀ either opposes the
claim that S contains only witnesses of S by choosing a potential counterexample s ∈ S, or alternatively,
∀ opposes the claim that S contains all witnesses of ϕ by choosing a potential further witness s′ ∈ A\S.
Assume then that we have reached a position (A, f ,−,ϕ) in a semantic game. If QA = /0, the player
∀ loses the play of the game. Otherwise the player ∀ chooses a set S ∈ QA. The player ∃ then chooses
5Somewhat surprisingly, the semantic game moves for generalized quantifiers we are about to define do not seem to have
been defined in the exact same way in the literature before. However, the article [15] provides a rather similar but not exactly
the same treatment.
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either a point s ∈ S of a point s′ ∈ A\S. Suppose that ∃ chooses s ∈ S. Then the game continues from the
position (A, f [x 7→ s],−,ϕ). Suppose then that ∃ chooses s′ ∈ A \S. Then the game continues from the
position (A, f [x 7→ s′],+,ϕ).
It is straightforward to prove that these rules give a semantics such that in restriction to formulae
of first-order logic extended with generalized quantifiers, the standard Tarski style semantics and the
game-theoretic semantics are equivalent. For the sake of brevity, we shall not attempt to formulate
extensions of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 that apply to extensions of L with quantifiers and Turing machines
with corresponding oracles. Instead, further investigations in this direction are left for the future.
7 Concluding remarks
It is easy to see that various interesting operators can be added to L without sacrificing Turing-complete-
ness. For example, second-order quantifiers can easily be added. There are only finitely many ways to
interpret a quantified second-order variable in a finite model, and therefore Ko¨nig’s lemma can still
be applied so that Theorems 4.3 and 5.2 hold. Also, it is possible to add to L an operator that, say,
adds |P(W )| fresh elements to the domain W , and then extends the interpretations of selected relation
symbols and second-order variables non-deterministically to all of the new domain. In the finite, this
operator does not add anything to the expressivity of L , but of course more delicate features of the
underlying logic change.
Connections between L and team semantics ought to be investigated thoroughly. Both P and NP can
be characterized nicely by logics based on team semantics; NP is captured by both dependence logic and
IF logic, and P is captured on ordered models by inclusion logic (see [6]). Further interesting complexity
classes will probably be characterized in terms of logics based on team semantics in the near future. We
conjecture that by attaching suitable operators to the atoms of L of the type k ∈N, it should be possible
to extend L such that resulting logics accomodate typical logics based on team semantics as fragments in
a natural way. The game-theoretic approaches to team semantics developed in [4, 8, 15, 18, 21] provide
some starting points for related investigations.
Let R be a binary relation symbol. Let L0 denote the fragment of L that extends first-order logic
by operators that enable the the manipulation of the relation R (only), the insertion of fresh points to
the domain, and recursive looping. We conjecture that on models whose vocabulary contains the binary
relation symbol R, already L0 is Turing-complete. Indeed, this does not seem to be difficult to prove
using suitable gadgets, but we leave it as a conjecture at this stage.
Finally, it would be interesting to classify fragments of L according to whether their (finite) sat-
isfiability problem is decidable. This would nicely extend the research on decidability of fragments of
first-order logic.
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